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RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: A
COMPARISON OF THE UNIFORM LAND
TRANSACTIONS ACT AND MARYLAND LAW
Barbara J. Britzket
Warranties of title and quality define the scope of residential
home buyers' rights against sellers and builders. sing a com-
parative analysisformat, this article discusses existing Maryland
warranty law and comparable provisions of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act to reveal serious deficiencies in the Maryland
warranty scheme. The author concludes that in those areas
where the Maryland and Unform Act schemes difer, the Uni-
form Act offers consumers more comprehensive protection than
Maryland law. In those areas where the schemes are harmoni-
ous, uniformity and related benefits can be achieved without a
major overhaul of all areas of warranty law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Buying a home is normally the most important purchase a con-
sumer undertakes. In residential real estate' transactions, the buyer is
faced with two primary concerns. First, the buyer must determine that
the seller owns the property in question. Warranties of title protect the
purchaser against this concern. Second, the buyer must ascertain the
condition of the home and its component parts, such as the soundness
of the roof and the stability of the foundation. Warranties of quality
guard against these potential problems.
This article compares existing Maryland law of warranties of title
and quality with the Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA),2 a
t B.A., Duke University, 1971; M.A.T., Duke University, 1972; J.D., Temple Uni-
versity School of Law, 1978; LL.M., Temple University School of Law, 1982; As-
sistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.
1. The Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA) definition of "residential real es-
tate" will be used for purposes of this article. The ULTA defines residential real
estate as:
[R]eal estate, improved or to be improved, containing not more than [3]
acres, not more than 4 dwelling units, and no non-residential uses for
which the protected party is a lessor. A condominium unit that is other-
wise 'residential real estate' remains so even though the common ele-
ments of the condominium include more than [3] acres or the
condominium contains units used for non-residential purposes.
UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT (ULTA) § 1-203(b), 13 U.L.A. 561 (1980).
"Protected party" means "an individual who contracts to give a real estate secur-
ity interest in, or to buy or to have improved, residential real estate all or a part of
which he occupies or intends to occupy as a residence." Id § 1-203(a)(1), 13
U.L.A. at 560. Thus, this article focuses on the typical purchase of real estate
which will serve as a home. Commercial transactions are not considered since in
the majority of those transactions the parties are more likely to be equally sophis-
ticated. See U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 1 (1983).
2. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 539-714 (1980).
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model act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.3 This comparison illustrates two themes. First,
Maryland law falls short in its protection of consumer buyers; the
ULTA provides more realistic and thorough guarantees. Second, in
the many areas where Maryland law parallels the ULTA, the benefits
of codification and uniformity can be achieved by the adoption of the
model act without a significant disruption of existing law.
Organized by these two themes, the article begins with a general
discussion of the ULTA, Maryland law, and warranties. The article
then develops the theme of consumer protection by comparing Mary-
land warranties of title and quality with the corresponding ULTA pro-
visions to illustrate how the ULTA provides more complete consumer
guarantees than Maryland law. The similarities between the two
schemes regarding marketable title and available remedies for breach
of warranties are subsequently examined to emphasize the benefits of
codification and uniformity. The article concludes by recommending
that Maryland adopt the ULTA, with minor modifications.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The UL TA
The ULTA is one of three model acts which purport to reform real
estate transactions law.4 The ULTA, which focuses on contractual
transfers of real estate that regulate the relationship between the buyer
3. The ULTA was approved by the commissioners in 1975 and was later amended in
1977. Id. at 539 commissioners' prefatory note. In making the amendments, the
commissioners consulted with an advisory committee composed of representatives
of consumers, bankers, mortgage bankers, title insurers, and life insurance compa-
nies. Kratovil, The Uniform Land Transactions Act. A First Look, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 460, 460 (1975). The Act was endorsed by the Real Property, Probate,
and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association (ABA), and then adopted
as the official ABA policy by the House of Delegates in 1978. Note, Summary of
the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 672, 672
(1978).
4. The ULTA's companion acts are the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers
Act and the Uniform Condominium Act. The UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND
TRANSFERS ACT (USLTA), 14 U.L.A. 209-349 (1980), addresses mechanics' and
materialmen's liens, statutory liens, lispendens, recording, and priorities. See gen-
erally Pedowitz, Unform Simplication of Land Transfers Act-A Commentary, 13
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 696 (1978) (summarizes USLTA); Comment, The Uni-
form Simplification of Land Transfers Act." Areas of Departure from State Law, 73
Nw. U.L. REV. 359 (1978) (analyzes differences between the USLTA and existing
law). The UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT, 7 U.L.A. 97-231 (1978), deals with issues
unique to this form of real property. See Maggs, Remedies for Breach of Contract
Under Article Two of the Uniform Land Transactions Act, II GA. L. REV. 275
(1977). See generally Dunham, Reflections of a Statutory Draftsman: The Land
Transactions Acts, 1981 S. ILL. U.L.J. 549 (assesses the land transactions acts).
Three other real property uniform acts also refer to sales of individual homes:
MODEL REAL ESTATE Coop. ACT, 7A U.L.A. 168-258 (Supp. 1983); UNIF. LAND
SALES PRACTICES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 367-404 (1978); MODEL REAL ESTATE TIME
SHARE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 259-308 (Supp. 1983).
[Vol. 13
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and seller,5 consists of three articles. Article 1 contains general defini-
tions and provisions applicable to both sales and secured transactions.6
Article 2 concerns sales of real estate, including lease transactions, and
outlines the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to
contract formation, performance obligations, breach, damages, specific
performance, the statute of frauds, and the statute of limitations.7 Arti-
cle 3 sets forth rules governing the formation of security interests, the
extent of the interests acquired, the rights of the debtor and secured
creditor as to the real estate, and foreclosure.
Modeled on the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),9 Articles 1, 2,
and 3 of the ULTA respectively mirror the structure of Articles 1, 2,
and 9 of the UCC.'° This organization reflects the drafters' belief that
many of the principles appropriate to the sale of personalty are also
applicable to the transfer of realty." Despite a heavy debt to the UCC,
the drafters added statutory provisions to cope with issues that arise
more frequently in real estate sales. For example, the title provisions of
the ULTA are far more expansive than the analogous UCC section.'
2
5. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 539 commissioners' prefatory note (1980).
6. Id For example, the definition of protected party casts the consumer as both a
purchaser and mortgagor of real estate. See supra note 1. The provisions for the
exercise of good faith are also applicable to both sales and financing. Id. § 1-301,
13 U.L.A. at 563. See generally Balbach, The Uniform Land Transactions Act.
Articles I and 2, 11 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 2-4 (1976) (discusses general
provisions of Article 1).
7. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 539 commissioners' prefatory note (1980); see also Balbach,
supra note 6, at 4-11 (summarizes provisions of Article 2).
8. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 539 commissioners' prefatory note (1980). Several commenta-
ries have been written on Article 3. Bruce, An Overview of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act and the Uniform Simpli'fcation of Land Transfers Act, 10 STET-
SON L. REV. 1 (1980); Kuklin, The Uniform Land Transactions Act: Article 3, I1
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 12 (1976); Pedowitz, Mortgage Foreclosure Under the
Uniform Land Transactions Act (As Amended), 6 REAL EST. L.J. 179 (1978); Com-
ment, Secured Transactions Under Article 3 of the Uniform Land Transactions Act,
1976 Wis. L. REV. 899; Notes & Comments, Future Advances Under the ULTA
and the USLTA.: The Construction Lender Receives a New Status, 34 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1027 (1977).
9. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 539 commissioners' prefatory note (1980).
10. Id. One commentator suggested that the commissioners thought that the public
would be better served if the structure and language of the UCC were followed.
Balbach, supra note 6, at 1. Significant portions of the ULTA track analogous
UCC sections. Compare U.C.C. § 2-708 (1983) (seller's damages for nonaccept-
ance or repudiation) with ULTA § 2-505, 13 U.L.A. 632-33 (1980) (similar reme-
dies set in nearly identical language). But since the drafters were not constrained
in their use of the UCC model, they excluded those UCC sections they believed
were problematic or inappropriate to the sale of realty. Id. at 540 commissioners'
prefatory note. For a section-by-section comparison of Article 1 of the ULTA
and the UCC, see Brown, Article 1 of the Uniform Land Transactions Act. Is In-
consistency with the UCC an Unnecessary Obstacle?, 1981 S. ILL. U.L.J. 585.
11. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 540 commissioners' prefatory note (1980); Balbach, supra note
6, at I (distinction between real and personal property is disappearing). That no
distinctions exist between the sale of personal and real property has been charac-
terized as a "possibly questionable assumption." Kratovil, supra note 3, at 461.
12. Compare U.C.C. § 2-312 (1983) (warranties of title and against infringement
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The drafters designed the ULTA to promote four underlying
objectives: (1) "to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing
real estate transactions";' 3 (2) "to promote the interstate flow of funds
for real estate transactions";' 4 (3) to protect the parties to real estate
transactions against "practices which may cause unreasonable risk and
loss to them";' 5 and (4) to promote uniformity among the states. 16
B. Maryland Law
In contrast to the ULTA's comprehensive statutory scheme, Mary-
land does not have an organized approach to residential real estate
transactions. 7 Rather, Maryland has an amalgam of decisional law
and statutes. While guarantees against apparent title defects are found
solely in decisional law,' 8 consumer protection against problems of
quality are controlled by statute. 9 Moreover, the rules governing la-
merely obligate the seller to convey good title) with ULTA §§ 2-304 to -307, 13
U.L.A. 601-06 (1980) (marketable title, seller's right to cure title defects, warran-
ties of title in deeds, and obligations as to title).
13. ULTA § 1-102(1), 13 U.L.A. 550 (1980).
14. Id. § 1-102(2), 13 U.L.A. at 550.
15. Id. § 1-102(3), 13 U.L.A. at 550.
16. Id. § 1-102(4), 13 U.L.A. at 550. The need the commissioners perceived for uni-
formity in real estate transactions law has been criticized. Because real estate
plays a critical role in the economic and related systems in each state, rules which
are responsive to local conditions, it has been argued, should be allowed to de-
velop. Kuklin, supra note 8, at 25-26. At least with respect to the issues addressed
by this article, these fears are unwarranted. See infra text accompanying notes
163-86. As of this writing, no state has adopted the ULTA in its entirety. Dono-
van v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 443 n.5, 453 A.2d 160, 165 n.5 (1982). The commis-
sioners' goal of uniformity has thus yet to be realized.
17. This lack of an organized approach is not surprising. Most property concepts
developed at early common law. The introduction of statutes has been sporadic
and based on the perceived need for change in common law rules. For example,
one Maryland statute changes the common law rights of an owner of a right of
entry or possibility of reverter. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 6-101 to -105
(1981). The effect of this change is to clear title of ancient interests. Similarly,
Maryland's statutory warranties of quality, discussed extensively in this article,
represent a modification of the common law concepts of caveat emptor. See infra
text accompanying notes 64-156.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 163-68.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 71-156. While this article focuses on Mary-
land's statutory warranty of quality, other causes of action may be available in
limited situations. An exception to the doctrine of merger by deed affords some
protection. If the claim made by the buyer is to a collateral matter such as an
express promise of quality, the doctrine does not control to destroy this claim.
Levin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 47 A.2d 505 (1946). In Levin, the sellers promised in
the sales contract that the heating system was in good working order, but the
buyers had to replace the boiler several months later. The Levin court held that
the doctrine of merger by deed was not an effective defense. Id at 539-40, 47
A.2d at 507-08. Maryland condominium buyers are also protected against defects
in quality. Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md. 693,
458 A.2d 805 (1983); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-131 (1981). One com-
mentator has argued that real estate purchasers are protected by the Consumer
Protection Act. Comment, Maryland's Consumer Protection Act:. A Private Cause
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tent title difficulties are a mix of statutory provisions, short forms, and
decisional law.2" Given this hodgepodge of decisional law and statu-
tory provisions, Maryland lacks the simplicity and clarity that mark the
ULTA.
C Warranties
The warranties of title and quality compared in this article are
promises that accompany real estate transfers which are designed to
protect purchasing consumers. 2' They may be expressed as part of an
agreement or implied by operation of law.22
1. Title
Warranties of title guarantee the purchaser ownership of the prop-
erty. Questions of ownership may arise both before and after the seller
has transferred legal title. In a typical residential real estate sale, 23 two
written instruments are used: a land sale contract and a deed. The
contract memorializes the parties' agreement and gives equitable title
to the purchaser;24 the deed transfers legal title.25
of Action for Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices, 38 MD. L. REV. 733 (1979).
Finally, Maryland homeowners may be protected by a Home Owners Warranty
(HOW) guarantee, which may be offered when new improvements are sold.
Comment, Liability of the Builder- Vendor Under the Implied Warranty of Habita-
bility-Where Does it End, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 593 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Liability of the Builder- Vendor]; Note, The Home Owners Warranty
Program: An InitialAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 357 (1976); Note, Housing Defects.
Homeowner's Remedies-A Time for Legislative Action, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 72(1981). See generally infra note 114 (states which have statutorily adopted the
HOW Program).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 45-54. Short forms are brief statutory forms of
traditional common law covenants of title. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 2-105
to -112 (1981); see infra note 54.
21. The term warranty "naturally means promise but in different kinds of contracts it
is used with varying meanings." 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 673, at 168 (3d ed. 1961). It was originally used in the law of real
property. Id The concept of warranty has been characterized as "a freak hybrid
born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 800 (1966). The con-
cept's dual origin still causes difficulties. Note, Builder's Liability for Latent De-fects in Used Homes, 32 STAN. L. REV. 607, 614-15 (1980); see infra text
accompanying notes 115-21.
22. An example of an express warranty of title is a seller's promise that he has "done
no act to encumber the land." MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-110 (1981). Simi-
larly, a builder's promise to provide a refrigerator and double oven is an express
warranty of quality. By contrast, a seller's promise of habitability or to convey
marketable title are covenants implied by operation of law. See infra text accom-
panying notes 85-94 and 163-68.
23. A land sale contract is usually not signed for gifts of real property. The time lag
between the land sale contract and actual transfer of title allows a real property
purchaser to search the title and obtain financing. A donee has no need to secure
financing and has less interest in possible title problems.
24. The purchaser is treated in equity as the owner of the property and debtor for the
purchase money because he holds equitable title. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
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By operation of law a guarantee to convey marketable title is en-
grafted onto all land sale contracts.26 Under this rule, the vendor
promises to deliver title which "a reasonable purchaser, who is well
informed as to the facts and their legal bearings . . . would be willing
to accept in the exercise of that prudence which businessmen ordinarily
use in such transactions."27 This implied promise effectively protects
the buyer against defects which he discovers before delivery of legal
title.
A deed may contain covenants of title.2" The six common law
covenants of title are the covenants of warranty, quiet enjoyment, sei-
sin, the right to convey, further assurances, and against encum-
brances.29 Unlike the guarantee of marketable title, covenants of title
are traditionally express rather than implied.3" These promises provide
needed protection against latent defects.
2. Quality
Warranties of quality guarantee the buyer a home free from de-
fects. They protect against problems with the home's structure, foun-
dation, and component parts.31 At common law no warranties of
§ 11.22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN LAW]; see also id §§ 11.23 to .35
(consequences of holding equitable title).
25. Id § 12.35; see also id. §§ 12.37 to .55 (requirements for an effective deed).
26. Id § 11.47.
27. Zulver Realty Co. v. Snyder, 191 Md. 374, 384, 62 A.2d 276, 280-81 (1948). For a
reaffirmation of the principles articulated in Zulver, see Berlin v. Caplan, 211 Md.
333, 127 A.2d 512 (1956); Myerberg, Sawyer & Rue v. Agee, 51 Md. App. 711, 446
A.2d 69 (1982). For a further discussion of the concept of marketable title, see
infra text accompanying notes 163-68.
28. If the deed contains no express warranties of title, none are traditionally implied
by operation of law. See infra text accompanying notes 45-58.
29. The covenant of warranty guarantees that the buyer will be paid for losses caused
by failure of the title which the seller promised to convey. 2A R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 899 (1982); see also Comment, Covenant of Warranty,
14 BAYLOR L. REV. 77 (1962) (discusses problems arising under the covenant of
warranty). Jurisdictions generally treat the covenant of quiet enjoyment as identi-
cal in scope and operation to a covenant of warranty. Brown v. Lober, 75 I11. 2d
63, 389 N.E.2d 1188 (1979); R. POWELL, supra, at 900. In a majority of jurisdic-
tions, the covenant of seisin is a guarantee that the seller has "ownership" rights to
the property. Id 896. The seller's right to convey generally affords the same
rights and remedies as the covenant of seisin. Id. 897. When the seller has
ownership of the property but a third party is in adverse possession, the purchaser
is protected by the covenant of the right to convey rather than the covenant of
seisin. Id The covenant of further assurances, enforceable by specific perform-
ance, compels the seller to perform future acts that will help ensure the buyer's
title. Id 901. The covenant against encumbrances protects against infringe-
ments on the title of two types: (1) those against the title itself, such as an unpaid
tax; and (2) those involving "physical facts concerning the premises," such as
easements or building restrictions. Id 898; see also MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-105, 2-107 to -112 (1981) (comparable Maryland warranties); AMERI-
CAN LAW, supra note 24, at §§ 12.126 to .130 (describing covenants of title).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 45-54.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 7 1-100.
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quality existed in real estate transactions.32 Today, both express and
implied warranties may accompany the sale of a residence.33 While a
broad application of warranties of quality has gained acceptance, im-
portant questions remain unanswered concerning the coverage of these
warranties, the buyers protected, the duration of the warranty, and the
seller's ability to disclaim or exclude the warranties.34
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION: WARRANTIES OF TITLE IN
DEEDS AND WARRANTIES OF QUALITY
The modernization of real estate law was an important goal of the
ULTA drafters.35 Recognizing that real property law is bound more to
ancient principles than any other area of the law, 36 the drafters sought
to harmonize traditional real estate law with the realities of current res-
idential transactions. 37 This harmonization dramatically increased the
protection38 afforded consumers.39
This perceived need for increased consumer protection is based on
several principles, the foremost of which is the need to protect the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties in their bargain." For example, in
residential transactions, a home buyer assumes that his newly acquired
32. Ohio was the first state to adopt a warranty of habitability for sales of residential
property. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
33. Of the courts which have addressed the issue, only Georgia and Virginia have
refused to imply a warranty of quality. Worthey v. Holmes, 249 Ga. 104, 287
S.E.2d 9 (1982); Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 247 S.E.2d 400 (1978).
Tennessee is the most recent state to join the majority. Dixon v. Mountain City
Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1982); see Shedd, The Implied Warranty of
Habitability" New Implications, New Applications, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 300
(1980); Comment, The Erosion of Caveat Emptor in Tennessee-The Advent of Im-
plied Warranty of Workmanlike Construction, 12 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REv. 367
(1982). For a list of jurisdictions which have adopted the warranty of quality, see
Shedd, supra, at 303-06; Comment, Implied Warranties in New Homes and Their
Extension to Subsequent Purchasers in Arizona, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 129-30
n. 126 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Implied Warranties]; Comment, Home Sales.-
A Crack in the Caveat Emptor Shield, 29 MERCER L. REV. 323, 330 n.43 (1977); see
also Note, Warranties in the Uniform Land Transactions Act of 1975-Progression
or Retrogression for Pennsylvania, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 162, 176 n.82 (1975) (types of
defects which have come under the warranty).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 101-56.
35. ULTA § 1-102(1), 13 U.L.A. 550 (1980); id. at 540 commissioners' prefatory note.
36. Id. at 540-41 commissioners' prefatory note. "[T]he body of private property law
• . . more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions
whose validity is largely historical." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266
(1960).
37. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 540-41 commissioners' prefatory note (1980).
38. The drafters specially noted the ULTA's provisions of implied warranties of qual-
ity. Id. at 541 commissioners' prefatory note.
39. The ULTA also protects borrowers and sellers. Id. § 1-102(3), 13 U.L.A. at 550.
40. Several courts have noted the importance of effectuating the expectations of the
parties. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 379, 525 P.2d 88, 91,
115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651 (1974) (en banc); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 289,
398 A.2d 1283, 1289 (1979). This concept can be extended to other areas. For
example, the buyer's reliance on the expertise of the builder becomes part of the
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title will not be challenged. With respect to quality, he anticipates that
the structure will function properly.4' Another argument in favor of
improved consumer protection is the inability of residential home buy-
ers, due to a lack of expertise, to discover non-apparent defects of title
and quality.42 Finally, aggressive warranties of quality advance the im-
portant public policy of discouraging shoddy workmanship.43 Only
when professional vendors are held financially responsible for their
products can consumers justifiably rely on the structural integrity of
their homes."
Neither Maryland's legislature nor its courts has fully embraced
the principles of consumer protection. Residential home buyers are
frequently placed in positions where they may be easily duped by so-
phisticated sellers. In contrast, the ULTA addresses many of these de-
ficiencies by taking a more realistic view of the low level of
sophistication possessed by purchasers. A comparison of the ULTA
and Maryland law on warranties of title and quality illustrates this
distinction.
A. Warranties of Title in Deeds
After a real estate sales contract has been consummated, ze., the
buyer has paid the purchase price and has received legal title by a deed,
latent title defects may arise despite an adequately performed title
search.45 Covenants of title govern the seller's accountability for these
latent defects. At this juncture, the ULTA and Maryland law differ
markedly because the former provides far greater protection for the
purchaser than the latter.
1. Rights
In Maryland no warranties of title are implied in conveyancing
instruments by operation of law.46 When the deed is silent, the buyer
buyer's expectation interest. Pollard, 12 Cal. 3d at 379, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 651; McDonald, 79 N.J. at 290, 398 A.2d at 1290.
41. The buyer's expectations are obvious. The seller, however, encourages these ex-
pectations. With respect to title, the seller holds himself out, expressly or im-
pliedly, as owner of the property he is contracting to sell. A builder-vendor holds
himself out, expressly or impliedly, as having the ability to construct a home
which meets reasonable quality standards.
42. See, e.g., Weeks v. Slavick Builders, 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, affTd,
384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970) (defective tile roof); Tavares v. Horstman,
542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975) (defective septic tank system).
43. See, e.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex. 1968); 7 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 21, § 926A, at 818 (3d ed. 1963).
44. The concept of allocating financial responsibility on the party who places a defec-
tive good in the marketplace is borrowed from warranties applicable to the sale of
goods. See McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 290, 398 A.2d 1283, 1291 (1979).
45. Problems may arise for several reasons. See, e.g., Luthi v. Evans, 223 Kan. 622,
576 P.2d 1064 (1978) (faulty description in deed); 6A R. POWELL, supra note 29,
883 (defrauding of creditors), 884 (incapacity of grantor).
46. "[Tlhere is no implied covenant or warranty by the grantor as to title or possession
[Vol. 13
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has no guarantee that he will not be dispossessed at a future date by the
assertion of a superior title by another person. Also, because Maryland
recognizes the doctrine of merger by deed,47 any promise with respect
to title in the contract for sale ends with the buyer's acceptance of the
deed.48
Under the ULTA, by contrast, four warranties of title are im-
plied:4 9 (1) "the real estate is free from all encumbrances";5" (2) "the
buyer will have quiet and peaceable possession of or right to enjoy the
real estate conveyed"; 5 (3) the seller "has the power and right to con-
vey the title which he purports to convey";5 2 and (4) the seller "will
defend the title to the real estate conveyed against all persons lawfully
claiming it."53 By its terms this fourth warranty covers not only those
who may challenge the buyer's title under a claim of right granted by
the seller or his predecessors, but also all claims against the property
from any source. 54
Since all four warranties of title run with the land,55 subsequent
in any grant of land or of any interest or estate in land." MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 2-115 (1981).
47. Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 416 A.2d 739 (1980); Canatella v. Davis, 264 Md.
190, 286 A.2d 122 (1972); Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 168 A.2d 879 (1961).
This proposition has recently been called into question. Goldman & Berghel,
Common Law Doctrine of Merger.- The Exceptions Are the Rule, 13 U. BALT. L.
REV. 19 (1983).
48. In 1948, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated in classic terms the doctrine of
merger by deed: "[A] prima facie presumption arises from the acceptance of a
deed that it is an execution of the entire agreement for the sale of the realty, and
the rights of the parties in relation to the agreement are to be determined by the
deed." Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub, 191 Md. 451, 458-59, 62 A.2d 354, 357
(1948). Thus, in Maryland, acceptance of the deed determines any rights which
the parties have under the contract for sale. But see Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross,
212 Md. 402, 409, 129 A.2d 518, 521 (1957) (when a deed is only a partial execu-
tion of a contract, collateral agreements are not merged).
49. Two provisions of the ULTA govern the four warranties of title. ULTA §§ 2-
304(b)(2), 2-306, 13 U.L.A. 600, 605 (1980). The ULTA mandates that a seller in
a contract promises to convey a deed which will not exclude the four warranties of
title. 1d § 2-304(b)(2), 13 U.L.A. at 600. The latter section then provides for the
implication of four warranties of title when a deed does not provide to the con-
trary. Id § 2-306, 13 U.L.A. at 605.
50. Id § 2-306(1), 13 U.L.A. at 605.
51. Id § 2-306(2), 13 U.L.A. at 605.
52. Id. § 2-306(3), 13 U.L.A. at 605.
53. Id § 2-306(4), 13 U.L.A. at 605.
54. This promise is a general warranty. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 29, 899. By con-
trast, special warranty deeds protect the purchaser only against third parties who
challenge the buyer's title based on a claim derived from the seller alone. Id; E.
FRANK, TITLE TO REAL AND LEASEHOLD ESTATES AND LIENS 97 (1912). The
four warranties are analogous to statutory "short form" covenants found in many
state statutes. ULTA § 2-306 comment 1, 13 U.L.A. 605 (1980). State legislatures
have provided for short forms of common law promises to shorten and simplify
deeds. Maryland's statutory short forms are contained in MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-104 to -112 (1981).
55. ULTA § 2-312 comment 1, 13 U.L.A. 615 (1980). This provision, however, can be
modified to the contrary by agreement of the parties. Id Once a seller has paid
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purchasers of the property are also protected by the original promise of
the seller. The guarantees of the seller's right to convey and against
encumbrances are breached only at the time of the transfer of title.56
Because the statute of limitations for breach of these particular warran-
ties is six years,57 original and subsequent purchasers have only six
years from the time of conveyance to bring suit for defects. By con-
trast, the promises of quiet enjoyment and general warranty are
breached when an actual or constructive eviction occurs.58 Since evic-
tions may occur more than six years after the time of conveyance, these
promises afford greater protection to the buyer and subsequent
purchasers.59
2. Assessment
The ULTA imposes more substantial obligations on the seller than
existing Maryland law. Under the model act, if the seller fails to con-
tract specifically to give less than a full warranty deed, the burden of
the four warranties of title will be implied. Conversely, Maryland law
provides that when the deed is silent as to warranties of title, the pur-
chaser will be protected only when a cloud on the title is discovered
before the time for conveyance.6 ° Maryland thus affords no protection
to the buyer who fails to negotiate for covenants of title.
This deficiency is serious and should be remedied by the General
Assembly. A purchaser should not only receive that for which he has
bargained, but he should retain it as well. Certainly one of the buyer's
expectations of realty is that problems with his ownership of the prop-
erty will not arise. This expectation may be frustrated by the inade-
quate protection provided under Maryland law. For example, when
the seller has lost his title to an adverse possessor who was absent from
the property when it was conveyed to an unsuspecting purchaser,6' the
unprotected Maryland purchaser could be dispossessed by the adverse
possessor. Not only would he forfeit the property, he would also have
damages to the buyer, the seller's obligation under the warranty is extinguished
and the covenant ceases to run. Id § 2-306 comment 3, 13 U.L.A. at 605-06.
56. Id § 2-306 comment 4, 13 U.L.A. at 606. At common law both of these warran-
ties are "present" covenants. E. FRANK, supra note 54, at 97-99. The ULTA
adopts this approach by prescribing that the statute of limitations on covenants
against encumbrances and rights to convey begin to run as soon as the buyer
accepts the deed. ULTA § 2-312 comment 1, 13 U.L.A. 616 (1980); id § 2-306
comment 4, 13 U.L.A. at 606.
57. ULTA § 2-521(a), 13 U.L.A. 650 (1980); id § 2-306 comment 4, 13 U.L.A. at 606.
58. Id § 2-521(d), 13 U.L.A. at 651. The ULTA adopts existing decisional law to
determine whether a breach has occurred. Id § 2-306 comment 2, 13 U.L.A. at
605.
59. For example, a buyer could take title in 1970, be evicted in 1980, and sue in 1986.
60. This protection is the marketable title guarantee. See infra text accompanying
notes 163-68.
61. Having perfected his title, the adverse possessor does not need to remain on the
property to protect his ownership rights. AMERICAN LAW, supra note 24, § 15.4.
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no recourse against the seller. This inequity is aggravated by the pur-
chaser's inability to discover the existence of an adverse possessor in his
seller's chain of title.62 Under Maryland law, the only means by which
a seller's lack of title may be discovered is to conduct an extensive in-
terrogation of prospective neighbors.63 Not only would this be a time
consuming, haphazard process, it would also work an unnecessary
hardship on the buyer in light of the seller's superior access to this type
of information.
The above discussion makes clear that the unsophisticated con-
sumer receives better protection under the ULTA's warranties of title.
Specifically, the ULTA secures important title protection for those con-
sumers who are unfamiliar with the intricacies of real estate transfers.
B. Warranties of Quality
In today's urban technological society, the typical purchaser of res-
idential real estate is most concerned with the improvements on the
property; the land itself is normally of secondary importance. But the
time-worn common law rules governing real estate transactions were
based upon the antiquated belief that the land itself was more impor-
tant than any of the improvements constructed on it. This heritage was
most deeply ingrained in the doctrine of caveat emptor.64
Originally, the doctrine of caveat emptor mirrored the expecta-
tions of the contracting parties. Trust was neither given nor relied
upon.65 While the doctrine has been modified and very nearly abol-
ished with respect to personal property,66 in real property law the an-
62. Although recordation is not required, titles held by adverse possession can be re-
corded. Frederickson v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356, 209 N.W. 257 (1926); AMERICAN
LAW, supra note 24, § 15.4. A traditional title search using a grantor-grantee in-
dex would not reveal this kind of title defect. A tract index, however, would re-
veal the adverse possessor's deed.
63. The purpose of this "inspection" would be to determine if, at any time, an adverse
possessor had been on the property for the requisite time period. Interviews with
neighbors would be the best source of this information.
64. For an excellent discussion of the history and development of caveat emptor, see
Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
65. The doctrine had its genesis in medieval England. In this predominantly agrarian
society, most transactions of goods occurred between neighbors. Since trading
with strangers was done at fairs held in large towns, a class of merchants devel-
oped whose business morality was such that "no trust was given or expected."
Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TEX. L. REV. 439, 441 (1960). The doctrine
of caveat emptor reflected the standards of these merchants. Id For a somewhat
different historical analysis, see Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer.-
The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 836 (1967). Professor Rob-
erts claims that mediaevalists were protected by regulations that punished sellers
for selling substandard goods and that caveat emptor was created by nineteenth-
century judges during a laissez-faire era.
66. The UCC provides that "[u]nless excluded or modified ... a warranty that goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind." U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1983).
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cient principle has remained in force.67 The end of World War II,
which marked the beginning of an unprecedented growth in the mass
produced home industry, triggered a shift in the doctrine of caveat
emptor as applied to real estate purchasers.68 Since that time both
commentators 69 and courts7' have begun to emphasize the similarity,
rather than the differences, between the buying of personal property
(goods) and residential real estate. This has occurred because the
buyer is in effect seeking a "good," that is, an improvement which will
house his family. This similarity has resulted in a minimizing of the
importance of caveat emptor in sales of real property.
Both the ULTA and Maryland have modernized the law of resi-
dential real estate transactions to incorporate the values of consumer
protection by creating warranties of quality. After a comparative anal-
ysis of the ULTA and Maryland law on express and implied warran-
ties, the duration of the warranties, their permissible exclusions and
limitations, and the buyers protected, it will become apparent that the
ULTA generally offers consumers a more comprehensive protective
scheme than that available under Maryland law.
67. For example, Maryland courts have steadfastly refused to recognize implied war-
ranties of quality in the transfer of residential real estate. Worthington Constr.
Corp. v. Moore, 266 Md. 19, 291 A.2d 466 (1972); Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross,
212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957); Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561, 92 A.2d 376
(1952); Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New Houses: Bethalhmy P. Bechtel,
27 MD. L. REV. 299 (1967).
68. Dunham, Vendor's Obligation As to Fitness for a Particular Purpose, 37 MINN. L.
REV. 108, 110 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Dunham, Vendor's Obligation]. For a
brief history of the change in the caveat emptor principle in real estate sales, see
Lawrence, Homebuilder's Liability for Physical Defects After the Sale, 7 OKLA.
CITY U.L. REV. 49 (1982); Shedd, supra note 33, at 293-301.
69. Comparing the protections given the purchaser of a two-dollar fountain pen and a
newly constructed home, and finding that the pen is protected by a warranty but
the home is not, one commentator noted that "[t]he law is not entirely devoid of
its own brand of wry humor." The "punch line" is the doctrine of caveat emptor's
application in real property sales. Roberts, supra note 65, at 835. For similar
comparisons, see Dunham, Vendor's Obligation, supra note 68, at 108; Haskell,
The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO.
L.J. 633 (1965).
70. The contrast between the rules of law applicable to the sale of personal
property and those applicable to the sale of real property was so great as
to be indefensible. One who bought a chattel as simple as a walking
stick or a kitchen mop was entitled to get his money back if the article
was not of merchantable quality. But the purchaser of a $50,000 home
ordinarily had no remedy even if the foundation proved to be so defec-
tive that the structure collapsed in a heap of rubble.
Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1094-95, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970). For simi-
lar comparisons, see Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d
88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974) (en banc); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398
A.2d 1283 (1979).
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1. Express Warranties
a. Rights
Express warranties are the explicit contractual guarantees of the
seller which vary according to the terms of the agreement.7' In creating
these warranties, both the ULTA and the Maryland statute use the
UCC as a guide, tracking its pattern and, sometimes, its exact
language.72
Express warranties are similar under the ULTA and Maryland
law. Both statutory schemes state that any "affirmation of fact or
promise .. .creates an express warranty" that the item at issue will
conform to the affirmation or promise.73 Thus, a real estate seller's
promise that a particular fixture will be included is an express warranty
under either scheme.
Frequently, samples, models, or descriptions are used when mar-
keting new residences. Under both the ULTA and Maryland statute, 4
these representations create explicit guarantees. For example, a pro-
spective buyer shown a carpet sample will be able to insist on the same
kind of carpeting under an express warranty theory. In addition, both
statutes negate the creation of warranties for statements that are merely
commendations or opinions of a parcel of real estate or its value.75
Despite these similarities, important differences exist between the
statutory schemes. While samples, models, or descriptions may create
explicit contractual obligations under Maryland law, if "an affirmation
of fact or promise" is to provide the basis for an express warranty, it
must be in writing.76 The ULTA, by contrast, allows oral promises to
become warranties.77 Also, Maryland limits express warranties to those
which are made "part of the basis of the bargain."78 The ULTA does
71. Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957) (builder promised
to provide particular kind of heating system); Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57
A.2d 292 (1948) (builder promised to provide insulation and two cellar windows).
72. Compare U.C.C. § 2-313 (1983) (express warranties by affirmation, promise,
description, and sample) with ULTA § 2-308, 13 U.L.A. 607-08 (1980) (express
warranties of quality) [and] MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-202 (1981) (crea-
tion of express warranties).
73. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-202(a)(1) (1981); ULTA § 2-308(a)(1), 13
U.L.A. 607 (1980).
74. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-202(a)(2)-(3) (1981); ULTA § 2-308(a)(2), 13
U.L.A. 607 (1980). Both statutes emphasize that the use of descriptions, models,
and the like will create an express warranty even without formal words indicating
the express intention to do so. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-202(b) (1981);
ULTA § 2-308(b), 13 U.L.A. 607 (1980).
75. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-202(b) (1981); ULTA § 2-308(b), 13 U.L.A.
607 (1980).
76. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-202(a)(1) (1981).
77. ULTA § 2-308 does not qualify the kind of "affirmation of fact or promise."
ULTA § 2-308(b), 13 U.L.A. 607 (1980). The drafters' comment to this section
focuses on "conduct." Id comment 1, 13 U.L.A. at 607.
78. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-202(a)(2) (1981).
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not impose this limitation.7 9
More importantly, Maryland limits the subject matter of the war-
ranty to the home and its "fixture[s] and structure."8 The ULTA rec-
ognizes that a contemporary real estate purchaser is interested in more
than the quality of the dwelling itself 8 by permitting the creation of
express warranties with respect to promises that relate "to the real es-
tate, its use, rights appurtenant thereto, improvements that would di-
rectly benefit the real estate, or the right to use or have benefit of
facilities not located on the real estate." 2 Thus, a developer's promise
to install a neighborhood swimming pool may be enforceable under the
ULTA but not under the Maryland statute.
b.. Assessment
The ULTA express warranty provisions appropriately afford the
buyer more protection than comparable Maryland provisions. The re-
quirement under Maryland law that a seller's promise be in writing
erroneously presupposes a consumer who will demand that all repre-
sentations be reduced to writing. The Maryland consumer who relies
on the seller's verbal guarantees is precluded from presenting any evi-
dence of the oral contract at trial. Maryland has thus opted for cer-
tainty at the expense of the buyer who relies on the seller's oral
statements.
The ULTA solution to this problem is far more desirable. The
notion that verbal promises can create warranties more accurately re-
flects the realities of real estate negotiations. The discussions that occur
during the home sale process are inexorably linked to the resulting land
sale contract.8 3 Allowing recourse for these verbal guarantees not only
better comports with the reasonable expectations of the buyer, but fair-
ness dictates that the vendor should be bound by his statements. 84
The ULTA increases protection by expanding the subject matter
of express warranties. Although both statutory schemes acknowledge
the shift in focus from land to improvements, the ULTA takes an addi-
tional step. The ULTA's realistic appraisal of residential real estate
79. The ULTA provides that warranties are created "if relied upon by the buyer."
ULTA § 2-308(a), 13 U.L.A. 607 (1980). The seller has the burden to show that
"representations made in the bargaining process were not relied on by the buyer
at the time of the contracting." Id comment 1, 13 U.L.A. at 607.
80. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 1-202, 10-202 (1981).
81. ULTA § 2-308 comment 2, 13 U.L.A. 608 (1980).
82. Id § 2-308(a)(1), 13 U.L.A. at 607.
83. It is impossible to imagine a sale of a home conducted without oral communica-
tion. As a vendor shows the property to a prospective buyer, the two parties will
invariably talk to each other.
84. Because conversations are inevitable in the course of purchasing a home, the
buyer's expectations are affected by the seller's declarations. The ULTA's drafters
stated that "[i]n actual practice representations made by a seller about the real
estate during the bargaining process are regarded as a part of [sic] description."
Id. § 2-208 comment 1, 13 U.L.A. at 608.
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transactions recognizes that the vendor's promises with respect to rights
incident to land ownership should be enforceable as warranties. While
the model act acknowledges the importance of the home, it further rec-
ognizes that the purchaser may also value the accompanying amenities
in the subdivision or development. For example, a purchaser faced
with a choice of two substantially similar homes may decide to buy the
home located in the neighborhood which promises a community swim-
ming pool, tennis courts, and extensive recreational programs for chil-
dren. Indeed, a less appealing home may have been selected solely
because of these offered benefits. Under the ULTA, promises of these
benefits would be enforceable by the buyer, even though the benefits
are not located on the land in question.
2. Implied Warranties
a. Rights
The notion that a seller impliedly guarantees quality in a land sale
contract is a radical departure from the antiquated rule of caveat
emptor.85 Both the ULTA and the Maryland statute, through the vehi-
cle of implied warranty, incorporate a seller's promises of quality into a
contract of sale or a deed which is otherwise silent on the matter.86
The two implied warranty schemes under the ULTA and the
Maryland statutory scheme are similar. The first implied warranty is
that a buyer is protected against the use of defective materials, im-
proper plans, and faulty workmanship.87 The second implied warranty
is that of habitability, 88 defined by the ULTA as a promise "that the
real estate is suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type."89
Maryland courts, when analyzing the parameters of the implied
warranty of habitability, have determined that the test is one of reason-
ableness to be decided on the particular facts and circumstances of each
case.9" When reasonable minds can differ, the jury may look to factors
such as government regulations, building codes, and evidence of "cus-
85. See, e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (197!); Pollard v. Saxe
& Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974) (en
banc); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Bethlahmy v.
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 I11. 2d
171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982); Elderkin v. Gastner, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972);
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
86. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203 (1981); ULTA § 2-309, 13 U.L.A. 609-10
(1980).
87. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203(a)(l)-(3) (1981); ULTA § 2-309(b)(l)-(2),
13 U.L.A. 609-10 (1980).
88. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203(a)(4) (1981); ULTA § 2-309(b), 13 U.L.A.
609-10 (1980).
89. ULTA § 2-309 comment 1, 13 U.L.A. 611 (1980).
90. In Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 399 A.2d 883 (1979), the court of
appeals first articulated a test of habitability. A buyer who had purchased a new
$132,500 home successfully brought an action on the basis of a breach of the war-
ranty of habitability because the well on the property became dry after 80 days.
19831
Baltimore Law Review
tomar7 or usual conditions" for homes of like kind and quality in the
area.' When reasonable minds cannot differ, the issue of habitability
falls to the court as a matter of law. 92
The buyer of a new home in Maryland, however, may lose both
implied warranty protections if he fails to discover a defect which a
"reasonably diligent purchaser" would have discovered.93 The ULTA,
unlike Maryland, does not condition these protections on an inspection
of the property.94
b. Assessment
Maryland's requirement that no promise of quality be implied
when the defect could have been discovered by an inspection is unduly
burdensome and analytically unsound. At a minimum, it adds an ad-
ditional element to a consumer's breach of warranty claim which forces
the buyer to present evidence of his competent inspection.95 More im-
portantly, the requirement undermines two of the basic purposes for
imposing guarantees by operation of law.
The typical residential real estate purchaser lacks the expertise to
make the inspection required to determine whether a home and its
component parts are free from defective materials, poor planning, or
faulty workmanship. 96 Modem residential homes are complex struc-
tures. Once plumbing is installed, wells dug, or electricity provided,
walls and floors hide the completed work.97 Consequently, not only
does the buyer lack the professional expertise98 to discover problems,
but potential defects are hidden from view.
In addition, demanding an inspection of the property prior to the
imposition of a warranty undermines the policy consideration for im-
91. Id at 715-16, 399 A.2d at 888.
92. In Loch Hill the court found that reasonable minds could not differ over whether
a failure to provide an adequate water supply constituted a lack of habitability.
Id at 715, 399 A.2d at 888.
93. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-201(b) (1981).
94. ULTA § 2-309(b)-(c), 13 U.L.A. 609-10 (1980).
95. Presumably, evidence of a buyer's competent inspection could be provided by his
own testimony.
96. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 65, 415 P.2d 698, 708 (1966); Weeks
v. Slavick Builders, 24 Mich. App. 621, 625, 180 N.W.2d 503, 505, af'd, 384 Mich.
257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 288, 398 A.2d
1283, 1289 (1979); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Wyo. 1975);
Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty,--Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14
VAND. L. REV. 541, 574 (1961).
97. Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 432, 437 A.2d 925, 929 (1981) (defects in
underground sewage disposal system and foundation wall not subject to "ready
inspection").
98. The cost of hiring a professional to inspect a home to discover latent defects im-
poses a prohibitive burden on the buyer. McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275,
288, 398 A.2d 1283, 1289 (1979) (citing Note, The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor as
Applied to Roth Leasing and Sale of Real Property: The Needfor Reappraisal and
Reform, 2 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 120, 137 (1979)).
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posing liability on builders for shoddy workmanship. Since vendors
are in the best position to prevent problems which render a house unin-
habitable, 99 they should be charged with the responsibility for defects
attributable to their work, regardless of the buyer's ability to discover
the defect. "
3. Buyers Protected
a. Rights
The number of consumers protected by a warranty scheme is a
function of the different causes of action it creates for potential plain-
tiffs. Generally, warranty schemes provide that breaches of warranty
may give rise to any of the following actions: (1) the original buyer can
sue the original seller; (2) the subsequent buyer can sue the original
seller; or (3) the subsequent buyer can sue a subsequent seller.
In Maryland, the warranty scheme only permits the original buyer
to sue the original seller. The definitional section sets forth the pur-
chasers protected by both express and implied warranties. The statu-
tory definition of improvement limits real estate buyers to those who
purchase "newly constructed private dwelling units."'' "Purchaser" is
similarly limited to the first or original consumer of improved realty.'o 2
"Vendor," though, is somewhat more broadly defined to include those
to whom a completed improvement has been sold for resale.103 Con-
tractors, developers, and real estate agents who market the completed
product are conceivably included in this definition. Nevertheless, these
definitions severely limit the class of buyers protected by Maryland's
express and implied warranties of quality. Apparently this limitation is
based on outdated notions of privity of contract.' °4
The ULTA by contrast greatly expands the classes of protected
purchasers. A seller's liability depends largely upon the kind of guar-
99. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 288, 398 A.2d 1283, 1289 (1979);
Elderkin v. Gastner, 447 Pa. 118, 128, 288 A.2d 771, 776-77 (1972); House v.
Thorton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 435-36, 457 P.2d 199, 204 (1969); Note, supra note 98,
at 137.
100. The builder is the party responsible for placing the defective product in com-
merce. McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 290, 398 A.2d 1283, 1291 (1979).
Arguably the inspection prerequisite merely requires that the buyer examine the
property carefully prior to taking title; it may reflect an understanding between
the parties that the buyer will accept the realty with any obvious defects. Unfortu-
nately, it is just as likely that the seller promised to repair whatever defect ap-
peared from the inspection. The inspection requirement is unnecessary and
rewards shoddy builders.
101. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-201(b) (1981).
102. Id. § 10-201(c).
103. Id § 10-201(e).
104. The privity requirement, which limits the builder's liability to the first purchaser
of a home, reflects a view that warranty claims sound in contract rather than in
tort. Mallor, Extension of the Implied Warranty of Habitability to Purchasers of
Used Homes, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 360, 366-69 (1982). And in a contract action, only
the actual parties to a contract may recover. Id
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antee made. For instance, all residential real estate purchasers are po-
tentially covered under the ULTA. When the requirements for express
warranties are met, any residential real estate seller in the chain of title
may be held liable. °5 Thus, it is irrelevant whether the consumer has
bought a used home, or whether the seller is a layman. The only limi-
tations on the creation of explicit guarantees are the requirements of
the law of express warranty. Original and subsequent buyers in all
three classes identified above may maintain an action for breach of ex-
press warranty under the ULTA.' °
Implied warranties under the ULTA provide some coverage to all
classes of consumers. Because the guarantee of habitability 7 arises
any time a professional seller'0 8 conveys real estate, 0 9 original buyers
are always protected. In addition, since the promise of habitability is
transferred with the property,110 subsequent purchasers who sue origi-
nal sellers are always able to enforce the warranty. Lastly, in the final
classification of actions, the ULTA overcomes parity problems by al-
lowing some subsequent buyers to sue subsequent sellers. Buyers are
protected when they purchase a used home from a professional
seller. " ' This extension of implied warranties to the sale of used
homes reflects the ULTA's adoption of the most recent trend" 12 in war-
ranty of habitability law, and clearly underscores the most serious de-
fect in the Maryland scheme.
b. Assessment
Nine courts" 3 and two legislatures" 4 have determined that profes-
105. ULTA § 2-308(a), 13 U.L.A. 607 (1980). The statutory language places no limita-
tion on the classes of buyers and sellers for express warranty purposes, but the
concepts of good faith and unconscionability are always factors to be considered
under the ULTA. Id. §§ 1-301, -311, 13 U.L.A. at 563, 574.
106. Because any seller may expressly guarantee quality, a lay seller of a used home
may presumably warrant quality to a professional buyer.
107. Unlike the concept of habitability, the professional seller's warranty as to the
quality of construction, id. § 2-309(b), 13 U.L.A. at 609-10, is intended to cover
new construction only. Id comment 2, 13 U.L.A. at 611.
108. The ULTA term is a "person in business of selling real estate." Id. § 2-309(b), 13
U.L.A. at 609.
109. Id.
110. Id § 2-312(b), 13 U.L.A. at 615. When a purchaser decides to sell, he may do so
without prejudicing any rights against his seller. Id. Thus, the purchaser may sell
the home at a substantial loss, because of obvious defects, and still maintain an
action against his vendor. In addition, when a warranty of quality is made to a
consumer who intends to live in the home, the warranty's protection runs to that
party's successors despite any disclaimer or limitation of liability. Id § 2-312(c),
13 U.L.A. at 615.
111. Id § 2-312(b), 13 U.L.A. at 615.
112. See infra notes 113-14 for a list of jurisdictions which have extended coverage to
subsequent purchasers.
113. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 186, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981); Redarowicz v.
Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264
Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437 A.2d
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sional vendors should be liable for breach of implied warranties despite
the transfer of the realty from the original to a subsequent buyer.
While the ULTA reflects this recent development, Maryland law only
protects first purchasers.
Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co. , 15 a 1976 decision of the Supreme
Court of Indiana, initiated this trend. After noting the elimination of
the doctrine of caveat emptor in a transaction beween the original ven-
dor and buyer, the court analogized real property to personal property
by referring to the diminishing role of privity in products liability cases
and in the law of personal property." 6 The Barnes court then con-
cluded that the "logic which compelled this change in the law of per-
sonal property is equally persuasive in the area of real property ....
The traditional requirement of privity between a builder-vendor and a
purchaser is an outmoded one."'"
7
The debate in the courts over the extension of vendor liability to
subsequent purchasers deals largely with the privity requirement." 8
When warranty law was first being developed with respect to personal
925 (1981); McMillan v. Brune-Harpenau-Torbeck Builders, Inc., 8 Ohio St. 3d 3,
455 N.E.2d 1276 (1983); Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1981); Terlinde v.
Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646
S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo.
1979).
114. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327A (West Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:33-3 (West
Supp. 1983). A number of commentators have applauded the extension of build-
ers' liability to subsequent purchasers. Mallor, supra note 104; Comment, supra
note 33; Comment, Builders' Liabilityfor Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 607 (1980); Note, Implied Warranties in Ohio Sales, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
177 (1981); Case Comment, Extension of Implied Warranties to Subsequent Pur-
chasers of Real Property: Insurance Company of North America v. Bonnie Built
Homes, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 951 (1982); Note, Real Property- Warranty of Habitabil-
ity Extended to Subsequent Purchaser-Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424,
437 A.2d 925 (1981), 12 SETON HALL L. REV. (1982); Note, Elden v. Simmons:
The Standard of Reasonableness Prevails-Implied Warranties of New Home Con-
struction Do Not "Necessarily" Terminate on Resale in Oklahoma, 17 TULSA L.J.
753 (1982).
115. 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976). For a recent discussion of the law of warran-
ties in Indiana, see Comment, Implied Warranty of Fitnessfor Habitation: Limited
Protection for Used Home Buyers, 57 IND. L.J. 479 (1982).
116. Barnes, 264 Ind. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 620.
117. Id
118. Id at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 621 (DeBruler, J., dissenting). Justice DeBruler, in dis-
sent, argued that privity should be required since the action was in contract rather
than in tort. Id at 230-33, 342 N.E.2d at 621-22. For similar discussions, see
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 I11. 2d 171, 183, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1982); McMil-
lan v. Brune-Harpenau-Torbeck Builders, Inc., 8 Ohio St. 3d 3, 455 N.E.2d 1276
(1983); Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739, 741 (Okla. 1981); Terlinde v. Neely, 275
S.C. 395, 398, 271 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1980).
Other states have retained the privity requirement and have refused to extend
warranty coverage to subsequent purchasers. See, e.g., Coburn v. Lenox Homes,
Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977); Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907 (S.D.
1979).
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property, courts grappled with similar problems," 9 and ultimately re-
jected the privity requirement. 20 It seems only a matter of time before
a majority of courts will decide with Indiana and the ULTA that priv-
ity is an irrational concept by which to limit liability. Maryland should
not lag behind.
In addition to the rejection of privity, important policy considera-
tions support the ULTA's coverage of subsequent purchasers by im-
plied warranties. A residential real estate buyer expects that the
residence he is purchasing will provide shelter for his family, which is
the essence of the concept of habitability.' 2' This expectation does not
substantially differ whether a new or a used home is purchased; the
minimum requirements of habitability should be present in both situa-
tions. 122 In a mobile society individuals move for a number of reasons,
such as a job transfer, 23 the end of a marriage, 24 or the death of a
working spouse, which makes it impossible to carry the monthly main-
tenance charges on the property. 25 Any of these situations may arise
119. The New York courts were the first to wrestle with the privity problem. Origi-
nally, New York disallowed recovery when a party injured by the defective goods
was not in privity with the manufacturer. Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N.Y. 468,
139 N.E. 579 (1923). Later an exception to this rule permitted recovery when a
mere agency relationship existed between the injured party and the original pur-
chaser of the product. Bownan v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 284 A.D. 663, 133
N.Y.S.2d 904, afl'd, 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165 (1955). New York further
eroded the privity requirement by allowing recovery for any member of the pur-
chaser's household. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961). Finally, in an express warranty case, the Court of Appeals of
New York abolished the privity requirement. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
120. Forty-two states have adopted some version of U.C.C. § 2-318 (1983), which ex-
tends liability to third party beneficiaries of warranties. U.C.C. § 2-318, Action in
Adopting Jurisdictions, IA U.L.A. 52, 54-56 (1976 & Supp. 1983). In Maryland
the requirement has been abrogated in implied warranty actions. MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 2-314(1)(a) (1975). Under Maryland law, actions on express and
implied warranties may be brought by family members, household guests, and
any other ultimate consumer if it is "reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods." Id ; see also Phipps v. General Motors
Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 961 (1976) (same result in strict liability).
In the real property context, courts which have permitted recovery by subsequent
purchasers for breach of warranty have relied on the abrogation of privity re-
quirements in personal property cases. See, e.g., Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739
(Okla. 1981); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
121. See supra notes 40-41.
122. A home buyer, whether buying a new or used home, continues to rely on the
builder's ability to construct a functioning home. While the used home buyer
does not know the builder, as the original purchaser did, this lack of personal
knowledge "does not negate the reality of the 'holding out' of the builder's exper-
tise and reliance which occurs in the market place." Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C.
395, 398, 271 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1980); see also Mallor, supra note 104, at 385-87
(discusses buyer's expectations).
123. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979).
124. Divorce, like the death of a spouse, may make the payment of monthly charges
financially impossible.
125. Id The Supreme Court of Wyoming also noted that a profit motive alone may
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shortly after the original settlement. While Maryland's scheme denies
warranty protection to subsequent purchasers based merely on the
number of times title has been transferred, the ULTA more appropri-
ately recognizes that buyers' expectations are based on the age of the
residence'26 and not on the number of previous owners.
Similarly, the inability of the buyer to make a competent inspec-
tion applies with equal force to subsequent purchasers.127 Indeed, in
some instances the subsequent purchaser is less able to inspect since he
has not had the same opportunity to observe construction of the im-
provement as the original purchaser may have had. The policy of dis-
couraging shoddy workmanship likewise cannot be furthered if the
liability of the builder-vendor is limited to the first purchaser. The
quality of his construction ought to be reliable regardless of whether
the property has been transferred. 28 While slight wear and tear may
result from transfers, the foundation will not crumble any more readily
if two families have occupied the home. As a result, the ULTA's exten-
sion of coverage to subsequent purchasers better implements the poli-
cies underlying consumer protection than does Maryland's limitation
of builder liability to the first purchaser.
4. Exclusions and Limitations of Warranties
a. Rights
Both the Maryland statutory scheme and the ULTA provide that
parties may exclude or modify warranties by agreement. In Maryland,
an exclusion or modification must: (1) be in writing; (2) explain the
warranty to be excluded or modified; (3) be signed by the purchaser;
and (4) set forth the terms or agreement that are applicable to the im-
provement. 129 Nothing in a land sale contract or a deed will effectively
exclude or modify the warranty. 130
The ULTA scheme is more complex. For example, the ULTA di-
rects that express warranties and their disclaimers be construed "when-
influence an early sale. None of these special circumstances discussed by this
court was present in Moxley. The original owners held the home for two years
and then sold it. Id at 734.
126. See ULTA § 2-521(a), 13 U.L.A. 650 (1980).
127. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 183, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1982); Hermes
v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 432, 437 A.2d 925, 929 (1981). The inability of the
subsequent buyer to inspect is caused by the existence of "concealed systems." Id
128. Because the builder has sole detailed knowledge of how the building was built, it
is irrelevant whether there has been an intervening owner. The effect of a latent
defect can be just as devastating on a subsequent owner as on an original owner;
the builder "is no more able to justify his improper work as to a subsequent owner
than to the original buyer." Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 169
(Tex. 1983).
129. Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805
(1983); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-202(c), -203(d) (1981).
130. See authorities supra note 129.
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ever reasonable as consistent with each other."'' This rule applies
when a sample, model, or description of the real estate is used to create
an explicit guarantee, but a contractual clause purports to disclaim all
warranties. 32 Only when it is impossible to harmonize the express
warranty with the disclaimer does the warranty control.
133
Disclaimers of implied warranties, by contrast, whether couched in
general language or the language of warranty, are ineffective against a
residential real estate buyer under the ULTA. 134 Thus, the insertion of
"as is" or "with all faults" in the contract of sale will not limit the
seller's liability.' 3  Despite these limitations, a seller may specifically
disclaim a defect which has become "part of the basis of the
bargain."' 136
The ULTA makes the enforcement of disclaimers somewhat diffi-
cult in two ways. First, the presence of a specific disclaimer creates
only a presumption that it formed part of the basis of the bargain. 37
Despite the inclusion of a disclaimer, a buyer may prove he did not
consent to the alteration of the warranty. Second, the disclaimer may
be challenged as unconscionable regardless of the seller's compliance
with the ULTA's disclaimer provisions. 13
b. Assessment
The disclaimer and exclusion sections of any warranty statute are
of critical importance. To the extent that warranties are easily dis-
claimed or excluded, the protection given to buyers under the statute
becomes illusory. Aside from being able to invest considerable time
and effort in the development of modification and exclusion provi-
sions, 139 contractors, developers, and others in the business of selling
real estate are in a substantially better bargaining position than the
buyer because of their expertise in contract drafting and warranty
law."4 The most stringent requirements should be imposed so that
clever drafting of standard contract clauses 4 ' does not eviscerate newly
131. ULTA § 2-311(a), 13 U.L.A. 612 (1980).
132. Id § 2-311 comment 1, 13 U.L.A. at 613.
133. Id § 2-311(a), 13 U.L.A. at 612.
134. Id § 2-31 1(c), 13 U.L.A. at 613. For the definition of "protected party," see supra
note 1.
135. Id. § 2-311(b)(2), 13 U.L.A. at 613.
136. Id § 2-311(c), 13 U.L.A. at 613.
137. Id § 2-311(d), 13 U.L.A. at 613.
138. Id § 2-311(e), 13 U.L.A. at 613.
139. A professional seller has a strong incentive to modify the contract since by merely
creating an additional contract clause, he can eliminate substantial liability for
defects.
140. McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 289, 398 A.2d 1283, 1290 (1979).
141. The classic personal property warranty case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), illustrates the ingenuity of professional sell-
ers. A national automobile manufacturers' association developed a limited war-
ranty which it argued disclaimed all liability, including liability for personal
injury, except for replacement of defective parts. The Henningsen court, in strik-
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created rights. Therefore, a combination of the Maryland and ULTA
provisions would best protect residential real estate consumers.
Maryland's requirements for exclusion or modification should be
retained in their entirety. Thus, the exclusion or modification would be
a written agreement which reflects the buyer's consent. This would
substantially ensure that the purchaser is actually aware of the legal
rights he has relinquished.
To further protect the purchaser, two ULTA requirements should
be engrafted onto the Maryland scheme. First, the Maryland statute
should include the ULTA requirement that a writing creates only a
presumption that the modification or exclusion was part of the basis of
the bargain. A purchaser of a home would be permitted to present
evidence of his failure to agree to the exclusion or modification despite
the existence of a writing. Second, unconscionability should be specifi-
cally identified as a defense to a waiver of warranty rights. This con-
cept protects purchasers against the seller's sophistication and
experience. The combination of the most rigorous parts of each statu-
tory scheme ensures that warranty rights will not be minimized.
5. Duration of Express and Implied Warranties
a. Rights
The duration of express and implied warranties may enhance or
severely limit the buyer's protections. While apparent defects in quali-
ty can be remedied at the time the purchaser takes the property, latent
defects may remain undiscovered for many years. To the extent a war-
ranty has a short duration, a purchaser's assurance of quality is limited.
In any statutory scheme, two provisions are relevant to the determina-
tion of the length of the warranty. First, a statute may specify the
duration of the guarantee. Second, the statute of limitations for main-
taining a warranty cause of action can be determinative.
In Maryland, the duration of the warranties is one year,'42 and the
statute of limitations for bringing a warranty action is two years. 4 3
The effect of these provisions is subject to interpretation.'" One inter-
pretation is that only those defects discovered in the first year of home
ownership are actionable. The purchaser would have two years after
the discovery of the defect to bring suit. Thus, if in the second month
ing down the "disclaimer," stated that no reasonable person would interpret the
clause as a limitation of liability. Id at 399-400, 161 A.2d at 92-93.
142. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-204(b) (1981). The one year period begins, if
the home is completed at the time of the delivery of the deed, at the time of the
taking of the deed or possession, whichever is first. If the home is not completed,
the one-year period begins at the earlier of the completion of the home or the
taking of possession. Id.
143. Id § 10-204(c).
144. Maryland's appellate courts have avoided the issue on two occasions. Potterton v.
Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 424 A.2d 761 (1981); Bay State Ins. Co. v. Hill,
34 Md. App. 593, 368 A.2d 1024 (1977).
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of home ownership the well ran dry, the consumer would have two
years from the date of discovery to sue. A defect, though, discovered in
the thirteenth month of home ownership would not be actionable be-
cause the one year warranty period would have expired.
Another possible interpretation of the statute is to combine the
warranty and statute of limitations periods to provide a total of three
years in which to discover defects and to bring suit. For instance, if a
well ran dry in the thirty-fifth month of home ownership, the purchaser
would have but one month to bring his cause of action. Under the
second interpretation, the statute of limitations would act to extend
coverage while placing an outside limit (three years) on the vendor's
liability. 14 5
The ULTA duration of warranty provisions adopts the latter ap-
proach. When there is no explicit agreement as to the duration of the
warranty, 46 latent defects must be discovered and sued upon within six
years after the buyer to whom the warranty was first made enters into
possession of the real estate. 47
b. Assessment
Both the ULTA and Maryland statutory schemes have the advan-
tage of terminating builder liability at a certain time. Some courts ad-
dressing the question of the duration of warranties have adopted tests
based upon reasonableness. 48 In these jurisdictions, the jury must de-
termine whether the warranty was in effect at the time the defect was
discovered. 14 The statute of limitations will begin to run after the de-
fect is discovered.150
Two arguments militate against this extension of warranty cover-
age. First, the use of a reasonableness test makes the statutory scheme
more difficult to administer. A court or jury would be forced to decide
on a case-by-case basis the duration of the warranty.'' Second, the
145. Given the adoption of the discovery rule for the running of the statute of limita-
tions, Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981), the Maryland
judiciary may be inclined to take this view.
146. ULTA § 2-521 comment 3, 13 U.L.A. 651 (1980).
147. Id
148. Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976) (age of
home one of the factors to be considered in determining liability); Elden v. Sim-
mons, 631 P.2d 739, 741 (Okla. 1981) (liability "measured by a standard of rea-
sonableness"); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979)
(warranty extends to subsequent purchaser for a "reasonable" length of time) (em-
phasis in original).
149. Since these courts have characterized the test as one of reasonableness, presuma-
bly a jury should decide the question.
150. Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739, 741-42 (Okla. 1981) (purchaser had five years
after "the cause of action shall have accrued" to bring suit). Since liability is
limited to latent defects, it is logical that the statute of limitations will not begin to
run until the defect has been discovered. Id
151. If each of the component parts of a home has a different warranty period, a home-
owner might not discover defects such as deteriorating carpets and clogged
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exposure of vendors to extended liability may be problematic because
of the amount and uncertainty of time involved. This extended liabil-
ity may deter participation in the important home construction
industry. 15
2
Since neither the ULTA nor the Maryland statute adopt the vagar-
ies of the discovery rule, the determination of which statute better pro-
tects the consumer must be based on the length of the warranty and
statute of limitations periods. The ULTA allows for discovery of latent
defects for a six year period, twice as long as the Maryland statute
under a liberal interpretation, and six times as long, given a strict con-
struction. Obviously, the ULTA position is better.
While a great number of defects may be discovered within Mary-
land's one year warranty period, 15 3 defects caused by deterioration may
be undiscoverable. A basement, for example, may not begin to leak
until three years after it has been poured.154 A faulty site selection,
with its attendant problems of sticking doors and kitchen cabinets sepa-
rating from the ceiling, may not become detectable until the land has
settled. '55 Faulty workmanship in the electrical system may not surface
until reasonable wear and tear has occurred. 156 Consumer protection
interests dictate that Maryland adopt the ULTA's six year statute of
limitations period.
IV. CODIFICATION AND UNIFORMITY: MARKETABLE
TITLE AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF
WARRANTY
In addition to the goal of consumer protection, the drafters of the
ULTA designed the Act to realize the benefits of codification and uni-
formity. ' 57 Codification of any area of the law provides for that area a
"pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment." 58 A code is
systematic and is organized in a logical fashion. 159 A code's methodol-
plumbing until six years had passed. Since expert evidence would be required to
establish the useful life of each component part, litigation would be complex and
costly. Moreover, when juries are permitted to decide these issues the results may
be inconsistent and, as a consequence, encourage litigation due to uncertain rules.
152. One student commentator has noted the planning problems that implied warran-
ties of habitability create for builders. Comment, Liability of the Builder- Vendor,
supra note 19, at 597.
153. The one-year warranty period allows the purchaser to observe and test the effect
of climatic changes on the structure and its component parts. For example, winter
weather tests the heating system, summer weather the air conditioning unit, and
spring weather the integrity of the foundation and roof.
154. Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976).
155. Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907, 908 (S.D. 1979).
156. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
157. ULTA § 1-102(1), (4), 13 U.L.A. 550 (1980); id commissioners' prefatory note, 13
U.L.A. at 539.
158. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code"Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 292.
159. Id
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ogy enables courts to implement its underlying policies in varying fac-
tual situations. 6 ° This type of enactment simplifies the law, makes it
more accessible, efficient, and easier to understand. 6' The uniformity
of real estate transactions law serves similar goals of simplicity and
efficiency.
The adoption of a code such as the ULTA has substantial advan-
tages over the amalgam of decisional law and statutes that presently
govern Maryland's residential real estate law. For example, a lawyer
with little experience in real estate transactions may represent a buyer
who has received a title report revealing major defects. The competent
lawyer will first search for a controlling state statute. When buyer's
remedies are codified, the search would be completed except for a re-
view of the opinions interpreting the statute. Accessible law likewise
reduces legal fees. For clients who are billed on an hourly basis, acces-
sibility means fewer research hours and reduced costs. Codification
thus serves an important consumer protection function.
Uniformity serves similar goals. Given the mobility of individuals
and businesses and frequent multistate transactions, uniform interstate
laws significantly reduce costs.' 62 A lawyer in one state would not be
forced to expose his client to the onerous cost of canvassing the laws of
every state affected by an upcoming real estate venture.
One may well question the costs for codification and uniformity.
In the areas of marketable title and remedies for breach of warranty,
the cost is very small indeed. In these areas, adoption of the ULTA
would codify existing Maryland law with nominal differences. By re-
taining present Maryland law, the benefits of codification and uniform-
ity can be achieved without drastic changes.
A. Marketable Title
The promise to convey marketable title is an implied warranty in
land sale contracts.163 A title search is conducted between the time the
contract is signed and the time that legal title is transferred. 64 This
160. Id The late Grant Gilmore noted that codifiers contend that a statute or code has
substantial advantages over decisional law. While a court can decide only those
cases brought before it and must rely on the facts in the record, statutory drafts-
men may look to numerous sets of facts and achieve more equitable and rational
solutions. Gilmore, Law, Logic and Experience, 3 How. L.J. 26, 35 (1957).
161. ULTA commissioners' prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. 540-41 (1980). The commission-
ers did not pretend to resolve all the "difficulties in the application of legal rules."
Id, 13 U.L.A. at 541. They recognized that given the complexity of some transac-
tions and the need for the interpretation of statutory language, problems would
remain. On balance, the commissioners believed rulemaking to be less compli-
cated than the present state of the law.
162. Id
163. 3 AMERICAN LAW, supra note 24, § 11.47.
164. For a general discussion of title examination, see id § 11.50. Maryland requires a
vigorous title search. "[A] grantee is bound by express encumbrances on his prop-
erty which could be found by use of the grantor-grantee index of the land records,
[Vol. 13
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search may reveal defects which a seller cannot cure. 165 If so, the guar-
antee of marketable title allows the buyer to avoid the contract. 166
The Maryland and ULTA marketable title provisions are substan-
tially similar, with both providing adequate protection for the buyer.
By implying a warranty of marketable title in every contract, the
ULTA reflects Maryland's standard common law position. 167 Also, the
ULTA drafters have adopted the traditional definition of
marketability. 168
B. Remedies
No review of the law of warranties of title and quality would be
complete without an examination of the remedies 169 available for
even though appearing in deeds not in the direct chain of title .... ." Steuart
Transp. Co. v. Ashe, 269 Md. 74, 96, 304 A.2d 788, 801 (1973) (citing Note,
Problems Resulting From Imposing Restrictions on Subdilided Lots by Straw Man
Conveyance: Gnau P. Kinlein, 19 MD. L. REV. 134, 141 (1959)).
165. For a discussion of possible title defects, see 3 AMERICAN LAW, supra note 24,
§ 11.49.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 172-73.
167. ULTA § 2-304(b)(1), 13 U.L.A. 600 (1980).
168. Id § 2-304 comment 1, 13 U.L.A. at 602. In Maryland, the following definition of
marketability has been applied at least since 1948:
A marketable title is a title free from encumbrances and any reasonable
doubt as to its validity .... The general rule is that the purchaser is
entitled to a deed which will enable him to hold the land in peace and, if
he wishes to sell it, to be reasonably certain that no flaw will appear to
disturb its market value .... In other words, a marketable title is one
which a reasonable purchaser, who is well informed as to the facts and
their legal bearings, and ready and willing to perform his contract,
would be willing to accept in the exercise of that prudence which busi-
ness men ordinarily use in such transactions.
Zulver Realty Co. v. Snyder, 191 Md. 374, 384, 62 A.2d 276, 280-81 (1948); Myer-
berg, Sawyer & Rue v. Agee, 51 Md. App. 711, 446 A.2d 69 (1982). Both the
Maryland common law and the ULTA force the buyer to disclose defects that
render the title unmarketable. Zulver Realty Co. v. Snyder, 191 Md. 374, 62 A.2d
276 (1948); ULTA § 2-305(a), 13 U.L.A. 603-04 (1980). Both give the seller the
right to cure prior to the time for conveyance. Clark v. Kirsner, 196 Md. 52, 74
A.2d 830 (1950); Friedman v. McLane, 193 Md. 565, 69 A.2d 253 (1949); ULTA
§ 2-305(a), 13 U.L.A. 603-04 (1980).
While Maryland places the burden and expense of the title search on the
buyer, Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 168 A.2d 879 (1961), the ULTA imposes
these obligations on the seller. ULTA § 2-304(e), 13 U.L.A. 601 (1980). The
Maryland rule is preferable because both parties have equal access to public title
records and the buyer, by paying for the search, has the best incentive to ensure
quality.
169. Monetary remedies are discussed in this article because they are unique to war-
ranties of title and quality. The additional remedy of specific performance is
granted more often in the area of real estate conveyancing than in any other con-
tract. Glendale Corp. v. Crawford, 207 Md. 148, 114 A.2d 33 (1955). In marketa-
ble title litigation, the ULTA allows the buyer to seek specific performance to
force a conveyance of real estate, even when the seller would rather pay damages
and retain title. ULTA § 2-511 (a), 13 U.L.A. 640 (1980); accord Styers v. Dickey,
261 Md. 225, 274 A.2d 374 (1971).
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breach of these promises. The ULTA and Maryland law are substan-
tially similar in this regard. While the ULTA sets forth these remedies
in a comprehensive scheme, 70 Maryland remedies are primarily found
in decisional law.' 7 '
1. Marketable Title
Under the ULTA and Maryland law, the measure of damages per-
mitted buyers faced with an unmarketable title depends upon whether
the seller knew his title was defective at the time of contracting. If the
seller was aware of the defect, the buyer is entitled to collect the benefit
of his bargain. The damages are measured as the difference between
the fair market value of the realty at the time for conveyance and the
contract price, plus any incidental and consequential damages, such as
the expense of the title search. 72 If the seller was unaware of the defect
in his title, however, the buyer would be limited to recovery of the
amounts previously paid on the contract plus incidental damages. 173
Typically, the seller will return the buyer's deposit and pay the cost of
the title search.
Both the ULTA scheme and Maryland decisional law provide for
situations when a defect is discovered in the title examination which,
while not rendering the title unmarketable, reduces the value of the
property. For example, the seller may not have title to the whole lot
which was promised. 174 Under these circumstances, both the Maryland
and ULTA remedy is an abatement of the purchase price, the ULTA
language being that the party aggrieved will be "put in as good a posi-
tion as he would have been had the other party performed."'' 75
170. ULTA § 2-509, 13 U.L.A. 637 (1980).
171. See infra notes 172-78.
172. ULTA § 2-510(a), 13 U.L.A. 638 (1980). The Maryland purchaser is similarly
entitled to the benefit of his bargain when the seller has acted in "bad faith."
Hupp v. George R. Rembold Bldg. Co., 279 Md. 597, 369 A.2d 1048 (1977);
Charles County Broadcasting Co. v. Meares, 270 Md. 321, 311 A.2d 27 (1973).
"Good faith" means that which is "ordinarily exhibited by a seller who is unable
to perform through no fault or fraud of his own, while bad faith is that shown by a
seller who refuses to perform when able to do so." Id at 321, 311 A.2d at 31
(citing Homer v. Beasley, 105 Md. 193, 65 A. 820 (1907)). If the seller was aware
of the defect (the ULTA standard) his non-performance is a result of his own fault
or fraud (the Maryland standard); the standards are the same.
173. Hupp v. George R. Rembold Bldg. Co., 279 Md. 597, 369 A.2d 1048 (1977);
Charles County Broadcasting Co. v. Meares, 270 Md. 321, 311 A.2d 27 (1973);
Berlin v. Caplan, 211 Md. 333, 148 A.2d 816 (1956); Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412,
148 A. 816 (1930); ULTA § 2-510(b), 13 U.L.A. 638 (1980).
174. See, e.g., Senick v. Lucas, 234 Md. 373, 199 A.2d 375 (1963) (purchaser compelled
to take the property when a portion of a tool shed was 1.2 feet over the property
line); Sinclair v. Weber, 204 Md. 324, 104 A.2d 561 (1954) (minor encroachment
over the building line does not render title unmarketable).
175. ULTA § 1-106 comment, 13 U.L.A. 554 (1980); accord Senick v. Lucas, 234 Md.
373, 199 A.2d 375 (1963); Housing Eng'g Co. v. David M. Andrew Co., 184 Md.
290, 40 A.2d 365 (1945); Hammer v. Westphal, 120 Md. 15, 87 A. 488 (1913). The
buyer would probably be limited to damages for the cost of removing an encum-
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2. Warranties of Title
The remedies for breach of covenants of title are identical under
the ULTA and Maryland law. Both provide that damages are mea-
sured as the "difference at the time of conveyance to the buyer between
the value of the real estate and the value it would have had at the time
if it had been as warranted."' 76 These damages are limited to the value
of the consideration paid to the seller. 77 In addition, the buyer is also
entitled to incidental damages, which may include the costs of defend-
ing the title and attorney's fees. 178
3. Warranties of Quality
Remedies for defects of quality are set out in a complete statutory
scheme in the ULTA. 179 Maryland's statute merely allows a court to
award "legal or equitable relief or both, as justice requires."' 8 ° Be-
cause of Maryland decisional law in other areas,' 8' relief under the
Maryland statute would most likely conform to relief under the ULTA.
Defects in quality may arise both before and after the buyer takes
title to the property. As with marketable title problems, the defects
arising prior to the time the purchaser takes title may be so severe that
he refuses to accept the home or may be so minimal that he decides to
take title and recover damages.'82 The measure of damages when the
seller has substantially breached is the difference between the fair mar-
ket value at the time for conveyance and the contract price, plus inci-
dental and consequential damages. 183
brance requiring payment of money, since in that situation the damages are cer-
tain. ULTA § 1-106 comment, 13 U.L.A. 554 (1980).
176. Crisfield v. Storr, 36 Md. 129 (1872); ULTA § 2-513(2)(i), 13 U.L.A. 642 (1980).
177. This is the majority rule in the United States. ULTA § 2-513 comment 2, 13
U.L.A. 643 (1980).
178. Id, 13 U.L.A. at 644. In Maryland, the buyer must notify the seller prior to litiga-
tion if he is to receive attorney's fees. Jarrett v. Schofield, 200 Md. 641, 92 A.2d
370 (1952).
179. ULTA § 2-509, 13 U.L.A. 637 (1980).
180. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-204(a) (1981).
181. It is likely the Maryland courts would consider these cases persuasive precedent if
a similar issue arises and similar relief is sought.
182. For example, a buyer at a preclosing inspection who discovers problems with
plumbing, wiring, and the foundation will probably refuse to take title to the real
estate. If a promised air conditioner is missing, however, the buyer is more in-
clined to take title to the property and sue for damages.
183. Hupp v. George R. Rembold Bldg. Co., 279 Md. 597, 369 A.2d 1048 (1977);
Charles County Broadcasting Co. v. Meares, 270 Md. 321, 311 A.2d 27 (1973);
ULTA § 2-510(a), 13 U.L.A. 638 (1980). In Iupp, the buyers refused to go to
settlement because the builder incorrectly installed the kitchen cabinets, failed to
provide a sump pump, and improperly graded the exterior property. Although
the buyers originally refused to take title to the real estate, they later sued for
specific performance. Hupp, 279 Md. at 599, 369 A.2d at 1051-52. In Maryland,
recovery would be limited to return of the down payment and incidental damages
when the seller is not at fault in his failure to perform. The rule for measuring
damages in quality cases would then conform to the rule in title cases.
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When defects of quality are discovered after the acceptance of the
property, two alternative measures of damages are available. The first
is to calculate the difference at the time of acceptance between the
value of the real estate and the value it would have had had it been as
warranted.1 84 Alternatively, the consumer may choose to recover the
cost of any repairs or improvements necessary to bring the real estate
up to the anticipated quality.' 85 This second alternative, however, is
limited by the doctrine of economic waste. This doctrine provides that
the buyer may not force the seller to pay for repairs which might ex-
ceed the value of the real estate itself.
1 86
V. CONCLUSION
Existing Maryland law fails to provide purchasers of realty with
adequate warranties of title and quality. The burden of negotiating
adequate warranties of title is squarely on the often unsophisticated
consumer. Unless he demands these guarantees, the law will provide
him none. Maryland's warranties of quality are likewise limited.
While a statutory warranty of quality exists, the scheme is too narrow
in coverage, too short in duration, and too restrictive in protections af-
forded purchasers.
The ULTA provides more comprehensive protection to the buyer
in warranties of both title and quality than the Maryland scheme. In
recognizing the inability of the typical residential real estate purchaser
to protect himself, the ULTA's drafters have fully implemented the val-
ues of consumer protection. By implying warranties of title and quali-
ty, the drafters have shifted the burden from the buyer to the more
sophisticated vendor. The drafters have also adopted the most liberal
and rational view by extending guarantees of quality to subsequent
purchasers.
Unlike the law of warranties of title in deeds and warranties of
quality, the ULTA and Maryland law are substantially similar with
respect to the law of marketable title and remedies for breach of war-
ranty. In these areas, the benefits of codification and uniformity can be
obtained with minimal disruption of existing law.
184. ULTA § 2-513(1), 13 U.L.A. 642 (1980); see also Fran Realty, Inc. v. Thomas, 30
Md. App. 362, 354 A.2d 196 (1975) (trial judge correctly measured damages as the
difference between the contract price and the market value of the property as of
the date of the breach).
185. ULTA § 2-513(1), 13 U.L.A. 642 (1980). The ULTA, by giving the purchaser the
option of measuring damages as the cost of repairs, protects the purchaser's ability
to enforce the contract according to its terms. Although a specific improvement or
repair might not, in itself, affect the market value of the property, it might affect
the buyer's notion of aesthetics. Id § 2-513 comment 1, 13 U.L.A. at 643. The
Maryland rule is identical. A district court awarded damages for the cost of re-
pairs. Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 710 n. 1, 399 A.2d 883, 885 n. 1
(1979).
186. Laurel Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 194 Md. 672, 72 A.2d 23 (1950); ULTA § 2-513,
13 U.L.A. 642 (1980).
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Maryland has the opportunity to be for the ULTA what Penn-
sylvania was for the UCC, the first state to adopt a new code. 187 Any
reluctance for change should be seen through the eyes of David Dudley
Field, an important figure in the early codification movement. He be-
lieved laws were "now in sealed books, and the lawyers object to the
opening of those books."' 88 Maryland should not allow the traditional
reluctance to change property law to stand in the way of the accom-
plishment of goals of consumer protection, codification, and
uniformity.
187. Pennsylvania adopted the UCC in 1953. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, at v (Purdon
1970).
188. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 580 (1973).
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